Colombia’s Transition to Peace in Coca-Growing Regions Stumbles

In the small town of San Juan de Micay, nestled among fields of coca — the raw material for cocaine — stands a dilapidated school with a tin roof. The town, located in the drug-trafficking hub of the Micay Canyon in southwestern Colombia, is accessible only by a rough dirt road winding through remote mountain passes. Here, clashes between government forces and the leftist rebel group Estado Mayor Central (EMC) are common. The group rejects the 2016 peace agreement that ended decades of conflict in parts of the country.

“There is abandonment by the state. The government never gives us anything,” said community leader Fernanda Rivera, sitting at a table inside the school.

She described a town with no clean water, no sewage treatment, few paved roads, and unreliable electricity. “The rebels are the real government,” she added, explaining that they enforce a curfew from 9 p.m. to 11 p.m., close the school, and mediate disputes among neighbors.

It wasn’t supposed to be this way. Leftist President Gustavo Petro came to power in 2022, pledging to negotiate with dissident rebel groups that had opposed the landmark 2016 peace deal. Last year, frustrated by the lack of progress on further peace agreements, Petro launched a new strategy aimed at controlling areas still under rebel influence — many of them coca-growing zones — through a mix of military and social interventions.

The Micay Canyon was the spearhead of this effort. The government pledged to send more troops and allocate $30 million for infrastructure — schools, hospitals, housing, roads, and internet connectivity. It also offered financial incentives for farmers to uproot coca and replace it with coffee, cocoa, beans, and fruit.

However, residents interviewed by Reuters said the military is struggling to dislodge the rebels and that promised investments have yet to materialize.

Rebel attacks on soldiers and police, including hostage-taking as recently as this month, have continued, reportedly under pressure from guerrilla forces. Large coca crops are still being cultivated.

Petro’s office redirected Reuters’ request for comment to the Department of Social Prosperity, which acknowledged that armed forces have yet to strengthen control in the region. The Defense Ministry stated that rebels’ use of small units to carry out rapid strikes has stalled social spending.

Amid Colombia’s ongoing financial crisis and rising national debt, such projects must pass a complex public planning process before approval. The government’s faltering efforts threaten critical U.S. anti-drug financing.

U.S. President Donald Trump has already threatened to “decertify” Petro’s anti-drug campaign this month, calling it ineffective. Republican Representative Mario Diaz-Balart proposed slashing Colombia’s non-military assistance by 50% to $209 million, citing Petro’s failure to effectively use U.S. support. A U.S. State Department spokesperson said they had no comment on Trump’s pending decision.

Colombia’s ambassador to Washington, Daniel García-Peña, told reporters this week that aid from USAID has already been impacted and warned that if Trump follows through, programs not directly related to drug trafficking — worth around $100 million — could be cut.

“This will hurt our efforts. It will hurt the United States. It will only benefit international criminal organizations,” García-Peña said.

The hardline stance may embolden Colombia’s right-wing opposition ahead of next year’s presidential elections, strengthening calls for tougher action against rebels.

Winning Hearts and Minds

Despite the setbacks, Petro insists the campaign will continue. He has called on the military to stay engaged and urged residents to abandon coca cultivation.

Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez told Reuters that over half of the 4,200 square kilometers of the Micay Canyon are now under military control. “The campaign focuses 70% on community development and welfare and 30% on military intervention,” he said, stressing the importance of gaining the community’s trust.

“If we don’t win over the population, we won’t win at all,” Sánchez said.

General Federico Mejía, outgoing commander of the army’s third division, compared capturing the canyon’s largest town, El Plátano, to “Wall Street for illegal economies,” alleging that cartel emissaries once met there to negotiate drug shipments.

Mejía also explained that progress has been slow because the area is “riddled” with landmines and vulnerable to drone strikes.

Military helicopters frequently patrol the area, but when Reuters visited in August, the team passed no army or police checkpoints — only those manned by heavily armed EMC fighters.

Although government troops with armored tanks and air support entered the town, they took control of two areas without patrolling the streets.

An EMC commander, speaking on condition of anonymity, admitted that military presence forced them to scatter into smaller units, but insisted that rebels maintained control and remained strong.

Residents say meaningful change is unlikely without significant investment. In San Juan de Micay, a health clinic and ambulance are maintained not with government funds but through small community donations.

On coca farming, local leader Edward Rubiano explained, “The state’s neglect has forced us to grow these crops. There has been no investment in social development.”

During a visit to a coca plantation, farmers explained that a three-hectare (about 7.4-acre) coca plot could yield $10,000 per quarter — far more than any legitimate crop.

“No crop earns as much as coca,” one farmer said while tending the field.

For Rivera, Petro’s initiative is merely the latest disappointment in a long series.

“We thought maybe Petro had a solution, some help, but he didn’t. We made another mistake,” she lamented.